📋 Tender Overview
The Management Commission of the National Council (CdG-N) has examined the legal bases related to the independence and management of Price Surveillance (SPR), as well as their implementation. It concludes that the law lacks clarity in certain respects, particularly regarding the delineation of the SPRs area of competence and the extent of its independence. However, the CdG-N notes with satisfaction that, in practice, the independence of the SPR is guaranteed, despite limited resources.
As a supervisory and regulatory authority, Price Surveillance (SPR) occupies a particular position within Swiss institutions. Its mission is to prevent or correct abusive prices resulting from a lack or absence of competition in the markets; the SPRs actions are situated at the interface between the state, the economy, and consumers. It concerns both prices set by powerful private companies in the market and those set or approved by public companies or authorities (communal, cantonal, and federal). Given the organizational attachment of the SPR to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (DEFR) and thus its status as a unit of the central federal administration, questions arise regarding the legal framework and the implementation of its independence and management. In January 2024, the Management Commissions of the Federal Chambers (CdG) tasked the Parliamentary Control of Administration (CPA) with evaluating the independence and management of the SPR. In this context, the CPA commissioned an external legal opinion to conduct a thorough analysis of the relevant legal bases. Based on the results of the CPAs evaluation and the legal opinion, the CdG-N today presents its assessment from the perspective of high parliamentary oversight in a report. It formulates six recommendations for the Federal Council.
The institutional design of the SPR remains appropriate. Generally, the CdG-N finds that the institutional design of the SPR is still appropriate today. As a specific entity, the SPR complements the Competition Commission (COMCO), with which coordination works well in practice. The organizational form and instruments of the SPR also allow it to act with agility and speed. In this regard, the commission particularly notes that the personification of the role of Price Supervisor is an important asset, facilitating public relations and establishing a trust relationship with both the economy and the population.
The area of competence of the SPR and its interaction with COMCO must be clarified at the legal level. The legal opinion commissioned by the CPA identifies a lack of clarity in the legal bases delineating the area of competence of the SPR and the interaction between its activities and the investigations conducted by COMCO. The CdG-N recommends that the Federal Council re-examine the scope of the Federal Law on Price Surveillance (LSPr) to more clearly define the SPRs competencies regarding prices set by public authorities and to reflect the consistent practice in this regard. The commission also suggests verifying the adequacy of the provisions of the LSPr and the Cartel Law (LCart) governing potential conflicts between the procedures of the SPR and those of COMCO.
From a legal standpoint, the independence of the SPR is not adequately regulated. The CdG-N also identifies a need to clarify and harmonize the legal bases related to the independence of the SPR. In particular, regarding the SPRs ability to perform its tasks without being subject to instructions (independence), the legal opinion commissioned by the CPA finds that the SPR is only independent in the area of prices administered by public authorities. The commission believes that a similar degree of independence should be legally guaranteed concerning the surveillance of prices set by public enterprises. From the commissions perspective, such a strengthening of the SPRs independence is necessary given the evolution of governance principles related to public enterprises of the Confederation and the risks of conflicts of interest arising from the institutional attachment of the SPR to the DEFR. The CdG-N emphasizes that, during a future revision of the legal bases related to the independence of the SPR, care must be taken not to compromise the current advantages of the SPR, particularly its responsiveness and agility.
In practice, the independence of the SPR is guaranteed but very limited at the financial level. Despite this need for clarification at the legal level, the CdG-N retains a positive impression of how the independence of the SPR is experienced in practice. Thus, the way the DEFR exercises its oversight over the SPR ensures that it can fulfill its mandate autonomously in substance. In a context of increasing task volume in price surveillance, the CdG-N nevertheless considers it important to take into account the risks associated with the limited resources available to the SPR. The commission welcomes the reflections already initiated by the DEFR to strengthen the financial independence of the SPR. It supports them by inviting the Federal Council to consider appropriate measures in this regard. The Federal Council is invited to respond to the recommendations of the CdG-N by December 11, 2026. The CdG-N met on September 8, 2026, in Sursee, under the presidency of National Councilor Priska Wismer-Felder (The Center, LU).
